Last week’s post examined the entire revision of the Church’s penal discipline, resulting in the new Book VI of the 1983 Code of Canon Law. The presumption of innocence (praesumptio innocentiae) means an accused person is considered innocent until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. The presumption of imputability (praesumptio imputabilitatis) means that once an unlawful act is proven, it is presumed that the person who committed it is capable of being held legally responsible, unless evidence shows otherwise.
Unlike civil law, where the presumption of innocence of the accused is the fundamental principle of criminal law, the presumption of imputability has been the guiding principle of canonical penal law until 8 December 2021, when the new penal law came into force. Today’s post focuses on the presumption of innocence, examining why the Church made this fundamental shift in canonical penal law.
The 1917 Code of Canon Law affirmed that imputability of a delict (offence) depends on the malice (dolus) and culpable ignorance and negligence (culpa)of the offender regarding the violation of the law (Can. 2199 CIC 17). It defined maliceas “the deliberate will to violate a law” (Can. 2200 §1 CIC 17). Regarding the presumption of imputability, CIC 17 affirmed that when there has been an external violation of a law, malice is presumed in the external forum until the contrary is proved (Can. 2200 §2 CIC 17). This placed the burden of proof squarely on the accused. The old Book VI CIC 83 softened the tone of this principle. It provided that “when an external violation has occurred, imputability is presumed unless it is otherwise apparent” (Can 1321 §3 old Book VI).
Sadly, the presumption of imputability provided in canon 1321 §3 of the old Book VI turned out to be an example of “erroneous technical legislation” as the legislator was uncertain of the theoretical implications of the legislation. Many argued that it should be abrogated. Reasons against it include:
First, the principle contradicts the natural law principle of in dubio pro reo, that is, in doubt, the accused should be favoured. The principle further contradicts the legal principle of no offence without guilt (nullum crimen sine culpa), thereby contravening the fundamental right to presumption of innocence until the culpability of the accused has been proved. The principle also questions the Church’s personalism and the centrality of the person, who is always good and redeemed by Christ.
Second, the principle is contrary to the teleological demands of each penal system, and even penal canonical law. Thus, it undermines the Church as a promoter of justice, equity, and liberty—actions evident in legal systems of modern states. Finally, the presumption of imputability neither provides support nor helps in arriving at moral certitude about a matter to be decided in a judgement in accordance with the norms of canon 1608 §1.
Sexual abuse of minors and vulnerable adults provides the best adaptation of this principle and its implications for the accused. The principle implies that once someone is accused of sexual abuse of a minor or a vulnerable adult, imputability is presumed and the burden of proof of innocence fully lies on the accused. Consequently, many priests were falsely accused and, just because they were named, they were presumed guilty.
Fortunately, the new Book VI of CIC 83 introduced a major change by adding the principle of presumption of innocence. The new law states: “§1. Any person is considered innocent until the contrary is proved. §4. Where there has been an external violation, imputability is presumed, unless it appears otherwise” (Can. 1321). Paragraph one is completely new. The presumption of innocence alters the perspective on penal canon law, as the primary burden of proving that an offence was committed rests with the accuser rather than the accused.
This change aligns with the spirituality of canon law, as it relieves the burdened conscience of those falsely accused of wrongdoing, ameliorates the discouragement that makes them believe they are always guilty and incapable of true holiness, improves the joyful freedom in Christ rather than living in fear of punishment, and reduces the risk of alienation from the Church. Ultimately, it helps the faithful in their journey of faith, especially in light of the grave consequences for the soul posed by false accusations.
Moreover, the presumption of innocence is fundamental in light of the misuse of precautionary measures as a penalty for an offence. Canon 1722 states: “To prevent scandals, to protect the freedom of witnesses, and to guard the course of justice, the ordinary, after having heard the promoter of justice and cited the accused, at any stage of the process can exclude the accused from the sacred ministry or from some office and ecclesiastical function, can impose or forbid residence in some place or territory, or even can prohibit public participation in the Most Holy Eucharist. Once the cause ceases, all these measures must be revoked; they also end by the law itself when the penal process ceases.” Misuse occurs when the Ordinary intentionally delays or abandons the penal process while allowing the victim to remain under a precautionary measure.
It is noteworthy that the presumption of innocence is in the first paragraph, while the presumption of imputability is in the last paragraph. This means that the primary principle guiding penal canonical law is the presumption of innocence. The presumption of imputability is now a subordinate principle.
May God continue to help us🙏🏾
K’ọdị🙋🏾♂️
